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Abstract: This article examines if the increased political discussions on social
media especially Twitter and Facebook before and after the March 4th, 2013
general elections in Kenya translated to a more robust alternative public sphere
that broke the hegemony of the traditional media as agenda setters or an alternative
space for the audience to vent out their frustrations and grievances about the elec-
tion. In the last most contentious elections in 2007, in Kenya, both new and old
media were blamed for fueling ethnic hate speech which culminated into the
2007/ 2008 post election violence. It is argued in this text that although voting
patterns in the March 2013 elections were clearly along ethnic lines just like in
2007, there was no physical post election violence like was the case in 2008. What
was clearly evident there was ethnic hate speech before and after the general elec-
tions on social media networks. We therefore observe that unlike in 2008 where
ethnic violence was fought out in the streets, in the 2013 general elections, the
ethnic war was networked. The article uses qualitative content analysis of some of
the messages sent on Twitter and Facebook to argue that social media platforms
only acted as alternative spaces for Kenyans to fight out their ethnic political wars
and not alternative public spheres for constructive political deliberation. So it
concludes by observing that social media networks in the 2013 general elections in
Kenya acted as ‘opium of the masses’ only serving the function of keeping Kenya
quiet and peaceful to prevent a repeat of the 2008 post election violence, but not
alternative public spheres to facilitate constructive political deliberation.
Keywords: Ethnicity; Social Media; Elections; Kenya; Hate Speech.
Resumen: En este artículo se analiza si el aumento de las discusiones políticas
sobre las redes sociales, especialmente Twitter y Facebook, antes y después de las
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elecciones generales en Kenia del 04 de marzo de 2013, se tradujeron en una
esfera pública alternativa sólida que rompiera con la hegemonía de los medios
de comunicación tradicionales en tanto que fijadores de la agenda, o un espacio
alternativo para la audiencia en el que tratar sus frustraciones y quejas sobre las
elecciones. En las últimas elecciones más polémicas en Kenia, en 2007, tanto los
nuevos medios como los tradicionales fueron acusados de alimentar la incitación
al odio étnico, que culminó en la violencia sufrida a finales de 2007 y principios
de 2008, después de las elecciones. El argumento de este texto señala que aunque
los patrones de voto en las elecciones de marzo 2013 se delinearon claramente
siguiendo un patrón étnico al igual que en 2007, no hubo violencia física poste-
lectoral, como ocurrió en 2008. La incitación al odio étnico era ya evidente antes
y después de las elecciones generales en las redes sociales. Por lo tanto, observamos
que, a diferencia de 2008 donde la violencia étnica se libró en las calles, en las
elecciones generales de 2013, esta violencia se canalizó a través de la red. El artí-
culo utiliza el análisis de contenido cualitativo de algunos de los mensajes envia-
dos a través de Twitter y Facebook para sostener que estas plataformas sólo sirvie-
ron para los kenianos como espacios alternativos en los que escenificar su
confrontación política étnica, y no como esferas públicas alternativas para la deli-
beración política constructiva. Por lo tanto, se concluye señalando que las redes
sociales en las elecciones generales de 2013 en Kenia actuaron como "el opio del
pueblo", que sólo sirvió para mantener Kenia tranquila y pacífica, con el fin de
evitar que se repitiera la violencia post-electoral de 2008, pero no como esfera
pública alternativa que facilitara la deliberación política constructiva. Palabras
clave: Etnicidad; redes sociales; elecciones generales; Kenia; discurso del odio.
1. Introduction
Kenya holds elections after every five years since it got independence in 1963.
The last general elections were held on March 4th, 2013 following the Imple-
mentation of a new constitution in August, 2010. One of the most notable gene-
ral elections in Kenya’s history is the 2007 general elections and the ensuing post
election violence in which over 1.500 people lost their lives; another 300.000
were internally displaced from their homes and property worth millions of
shillings was destroyed. Both new and traditional media were partly blamed for
fuelling “tribal hate speech” during the electioneering period and immediately
after the disputed presidential results were announced. The mainstream tradi-
tional media were especially blamed for being compromised by their political
biases which were largely ethnic based hence could not act as critical and vigilant
public watchdogs keen on monitoring, preventing or highlighting ethnicised
labelling (Makokha, 2010; BBC World Trust policy Brief No. 1, 2008). 
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From a historical perspective, ethnicised politics in Kenya can be traced
from Kenya’s colonial past. Ethnicity significantly informed the formation of the
first national political parties in Kenya which led to the country’s independen-
ce in 1963 (Wanyama, 2010: 65). Leaders from the dominant ethnic groups, the
Kikuyus and the Luos (these still are the biggest and ‘worst’ political adversaries)
formed the first national political party, Kenya African National Union (KANU)
in 1960. The smaller ethnic groups (among them the Kalenjins, the Kamba, the
Luhya, Maasai and ethnic groups from the Coastal region) felt left out and came
together to form the second national political party, the Kenya African Demo-
cratic Union (KADU). Therefore although the main objective of these two
parties was to defeat the colonisers, ethnic identities were at the core of these
political organisations (Wanyama, 2010: 66). It can however be observed that
what is new about “modern” ethnicised politics in Kenya is the means in which
it is executed; through new media, especially social media with potentially signi-
ficant reach and impact on the society as a whole.
After independence in 1963, the dominant party, KANU, partly coerced
and partly persuaded KADU leaders to dissolve their party in the name of “natio-
nal unity”. The first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, started the trend of
“political rewards” by appointing the former KADU leaders who cooperated to
the cabinet, an enviable chance to have a taste of Uhuru (Kiswahili term for
“Independence”). Those who refused to defect were denied these prestigious
cabinet positions and their constituencies were marginalised (Oloo, 2010;
Wanjama, 2010). Ethnicity has been regarded as a major factor in most African
countries especially during elections. Ethnicity has shaped political discourse in
Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Cameroon and South Afri-
ca among others although this has not necessarily translated to political violen-
ce in most cases (Nyamnjoh, 2010; Maweu, 2012). 
The culture of ethnicised politics and the allocation of state resources, espe-
cially public land has therefore been present in Kenya right from independence
through to multipartysm in the 1990s up until now.
As Oloo (2010: 47) notes,
“The distribution of both public resources and government posi-
tions has always been ethnic based. The ethnic groups controlling State
House have systematically favoured their own communities. Kenyan
governments have consequently taken part in ethnic politics, most likely
through ethnically-based resource distribution and certainly through
ethnically-inclined appointment policies. Public resource distribution is
therefore viewed as a system of ethnic punishment and reward, and poli-
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tics itself has, due to this government “bias” been diminished into a game
of ethnic patronage”. 
The 2007/2008 post election violence in which over 1.500 people lost their
lives, 300.000 were internally displaced from their homes and property worth
millions of shillings was destroyed marked the darkest moment in the history of
Kenya since Independence. Owing to “quiet and peace” before and after the
march, 2013 elections, one can easily observe that indeed Kenyans learned from
their mistakes in 2007/2008 post election violence. But that is only before chec-
king out what was making rounds in the social media networks especially Twitter
and Facebook. The March 2013 General Elections in Kenya took place following
major reforms and massive society-wide efforts for the elections to be peaceful,
transparent and credible. On the Election Day, there was a huge turnout and
Kenyan voters demonstrated remarkable patience amidst several false starts. Gene-
rally, there prevailed a calm democratic spirit during the whole voting period.
While there were several serious violent incidents which occurred in some parts
of the country, overall the elections were regarded as a huge success (European
Union Elections Observation Mission, 2013).
The March 2013 elections were phenomenal in Kenya’s history in that they
were the first real test of Kenya’s new Constitution, implemented in August 2010,
a new electoral framework –the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commis-
sion (IEBC), and a reformed Judiciary–. Kenyans were therefore highly optimis-
tic and keen to exercise their civic and democratic voting rights under the new
constitution, hence the exceptionally high voter turnout since independence. The
elections were also an ambitious undertaking since it was the first time Kenyans
were electing the president, the national assembly, women’s representatives, the
senate, governors and county assemblies in one day. This placed enormous
responsibility and called for major endeavours on the part of the Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Kenya’s legal institutions, its poli-
tical parties, civil society and other stakeholders, as well as dedication on the part of
Kenya’s electorate (European Union Elections Observation Mission, 2013).
The media were particularly active in advocating for a peaceful process.
They offered extensive coverage of elections, held numerous talk shows with
experts, organized the first Presidential debate ever since independence featuring
all eight presidential candidates and made public information about contestants.
But owing to what happened in 2007/2008 where the main stream media were
blamed for fuelling the post election violence, it was also evident that the major
broadcast media filtered potentially disagreeable messages that might not conform
to their calls for calm, patience and peace (European Union Elections Observa-
tion Mission, 2013). The media particularly censured potentially acrimonious
information on the Election Day, during vote count, which took one week (the
longest in Kenya’s history and during the run up to the Supreme Court Ruling
after the main opposition political Party, CORD, went to court to challenge the
validity of the elections. But as the main stream media censored itself to ensure
peace and calm in the country, the country was ‘burning’ through the ethnic hate
messages transmitted through social media.
The Networked ethnic hate speech did not go unnoticed by the National
Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), which was formed by the govern-
ment to facilitate national healing after the 2007/2008 post election. The NCIC
Vice Chairperson, Milly Lwanga, was quoted observing that “Hate speech on
social media had actually subsided to a great extent in the period before the Gene-
ral Election. But then we noted that just immediately after the elections, when the
results started coming in, particularly with the delayed tallying of the presidential
results, hate was rising to levels that were becoming uncontrollable” (Capital
News, March 18, 2013). Under Article 13 of the National Cohesion and Integra-
tion Act of 2008, a person who uses speech (including words, programs, images or
plays) that is “threatening, abusive or insulting or involves the use of threatening,
abusive or insulting words or behaviour commits an offence if such person intends
thereby to stir up ethnic hatred, or having regard to all the circumstances, ethnic
hatred is likely to be stirred up.” But though the government managed to close
down some online forums such as Mashujaa.com, nothing much could be done
to curb the numerous hate speech doing rounds especially on Face Book on both
private and group pages. 
2. Networking ethnic war through Twitter and Facebook
Proponents of the democratizing power of social media (Jeong-su, 2003;
Papacharissi, 2002, 2004; Woo-Young, 2005), profess the social media’s capacity
to empower ordinary people to beat “big media” in the agenda setting scene.
Such enthusiasts argue that new media in general and social media in particular
will increase political participation and pave the way for a new democratic uto-
pia. The successful use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter,
MySpace and YouTube in mobilizing political support in developed democra-
cies such as the US by Barrack Obama in 2008 and 2012 and David Cameron
in the UK in 2010 as well as the political uprising in the Arab world popularly
known as the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya ignited and catalysed by
social media among others has re-ignited debates about the power of new media
in political mobilization. In particular, online media is seen as promoting com-
municative democracy by recovering the right of public debate for social groups
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that have been deprived of access to the existing media. These new media are
characterized by “post-capitalization, the expansion of access rights, and interac-
tive communication” (Yim Jeong-su 2003: 40). It is further argued that the alter-
native forums created by such new media vitalize public opinion creation by bot-
tom-up agenda setting. Such media therefore play a major role in producing and
disseminating debates that challenge the dominant social order and work to cre-
ate new space that offers opportunities for political participation. In the new net-
work society of instant messaging, blogging and social networking, politics has
become fundamentally media politics. 
Although it is without doubt that new media technologies provide the citi-
zens with new tools to facilitate participation in social and political matters, it is
important to critically analyze the question of whether new media does offer a
new public sphere different from that provided by the old media hence enhan-
cing democracy or merely new public spaces where alternative discourse takes
place. The advent of multiparty politics in Kenya in the 1990s brought with it the
liberalisation of airwaves and the proliferation of the media in Kenya.
Multipartysm was anticipated to bring in the politics of ideology, which would
replace ethnic based politics just the same way the proliferation of media was
anticipated to expand democratic space. The media in Kenya was in the forefront
in the fight for multiparty democracy in the early 1990s and this fight persisted
until private media was free from direct government control.
There has however been a consistent pattern of visible ethnic-based politics
in subsequent elections in Kenya since the advent of liberalized media and mul-
tiparty politics in 1992. Multiparty politics seems to have done nothing to chan-
ge Kenyans’ perception that political patronage would follow ethnic lines and
therefore ethnic voting was evident in the 2005 referendum on the draft consti-
tution, the 2007 general elections (Oloo, 2010) as well as the 2013 elections.
Although new media, especially social media can easily be regarded as the alter-
native media through which citizens can dilute this ethnicised pattern of politics,
an analysis of the content in social media shows that it is much more ethnicised
than in old media where we have some basic regulatory standards. 
3. How ethnic hate speech was networked through Twitter and
Facebook in the March 2013 elections in Kenya
Since the 2007/8 Post Election Violence in which Hate speech mainly through
Short Text Messages via mobile phones was said to have played a major role,
ethnic hate speech has garnered growing interest in Kenya. Electoral process in
Kenya is by and large determined by affiliation to the “right” party; which is
naturally the party led by one of the ethnic community’s own members (Oloo,
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2010). This is so critical to the extent that even the most popular politician will
have difficulty being elected if he/she stands on the ticket of a party associated
with and led by another ethnic community. The ultimate goal of general elec-
tions in Kenya can arguably be said to be either to capture the presidency for the
ethnic group from which the president hails or belong to a party that is in the
“good books” of the President’s party, so that you can be closer to the “eating
table” (Oloo, 2010). Political representation in Kenyan politics is thus defined
by the community not the individual. Political parties tend to form on the
bedrock of an ethnic base hence the key political heavy weights are acknowled-
ged leaders of their ethnic groups. Voters are therefore asked to choose among
contenders for office from their own ethnic group.
Ethnicity (tribalism) has been argued as playing the biggest part in the
success of one’s political career in Kenya (Oloo, 2010). Both political leaders
and the masses view the presidency not as a national symbol, but a tribal office,
which allows members of the president’s tribe to “eat”1. Unlike in the advanced
democracies, politics in Kenya is “life-giving”, that is, politics intrudes deeply
into the lives of people (Steeves, 2006). Holding political office largely determi-
nes whether one gets access to land, to credit and other key resources hence the
contestation for power, to have a position at the commanding heights of the poli-
tical system, is an intense and continuous struggle (Steeves, 2006). An individual
politician in Kenya is defined by one’s ethnic community and therefore one’s
loyalty and actions are framed within an ethnic identity.
In the March 2013 general elections, we had two major political camps in
Kenya; The Jubilee Alliance led by the current president Uhuru Kenyatta who
is from the Kikuyu ethnic community and his deputy Wiliam Ruto, who is from
the Kalenjin ethnic community. The other camp CORD, was led by the former
Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, who is from the Luo ethnic community and
Kalonzo Musyoka, who is from the Kamba ethnic community. Most voters were
therefore either Jubilee supporters or CORD supporters depending on which
side ‘your person’ was. As the vote count illustrated, the Jubilee Alliance got over-
whelming support from the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities whereas CORD
got overwhelming support from the Luo, Kamba, Luhya and ethnic communi-
ties from the Coastal region in line with the leading political (read tribal) chiefs
from these communities. Therefore the ethnic hate messages were mainly
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[01] The ethnic elites from the president’s ethnic group are assured of plum jobs in high public posi-
tions from which huge kickbacks are drawn and lucrative government contracts are won.
Although the masses from the president’s ethnic group do not enjoy these direct benefits, they
nevertheless vote for one of their own (Jonyo, 2003; Wanyande, 2006).
between Jubilee and CORD supporters and centred on calling for the discrimi-
nation or harming of members of a particular tribe, stereotypes associated with
the different tribes and name calling of the lead politicians from a particular
tribe especially Raila of CORD and Kenyatta of Jubilee.
4. Methodology
To achieve the stated study objective of establishing how ethnic war was networ-
ked in the 2013 general elections in Kenya, it was implemented a qualitative
content analysis of some of the hate messages exchanged online during the elec-
tioneering period. Qualitative content analysis consists the use of known literatu-
re to contextualise readings of texts, re-articulating the meanings of texts in view of
assumed contexts as well as the search of multiple interpretations of texts by consi-
dering a diversity of voices; alternative, dominant, oppositional (Krippendorf,
2004). Qualitative researchers make use of “weaving quotes from the analysed texts
and literature about the contexts of these texts into their conclusions, by construc-
ting parallelisms, by engaging in triangulations, and by elaborating on any meta-
phors they can identify” (Krippendorf, 2004: 88). 
A purposive sample of 30 hate messages exchanged between January 2013
and May 2013 was chosen for the analysis based on two of the categories used
by Umati to monitor hate speech: offensive speech and extremely dangerous
speech. The research sampled 15 messages for each category. The researcher
purposively sought messages that were extremely inciting either because they
either used derogatory remarks, explicitly called members of one community to
kill members of another community, explicitly called for one community to
forcibly evict members of another community from their land as well as those
that were offensive in that they were intended to insult a particular group
through stereotypes or sheer abuses. The messages were therefore analysed
under the two themes/ categories: offensive speech and extremely dangerous
speech. The main aim was to examine how citizens used new media (tweeter
and Facebook) to fight out their ethnic wars online unlike in 2007/2008 post
election violence where the war was physically on the streets. 
4. 1. Procedures
For analysis, all the sampled messages were categorized as “ethnic comments
meant to insult a particular group” and “extremely Inciting/Inflammatory speech”
that had the highest potential to incite violence owing to their similarity in what
was circulated mainly through mobile phones Short Text Messages in 2007/2008.
According to a report released in May 2013 by Umati, an online monitoring firm
that documented some of the hate messages circulated; there was a dramatic rise
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in online offensive speeches circulated mainly through Facebook between the
month of March 2013 (the election month) and February 2013, the month prior
to the elections. In February 2013 there were 197 extremely inflammatory spee-
ches which rose to 321 in March and general offensive messages rose from 122 in
February to 405 in March (Umati Report, 2013). 
Hate speech is variously defined in law, but in this work it is generally
understood to mean speech that denigrates people on the basis of their
membership in a group, such as an ethnic or religious group (Benesch, 2011).
Benesch argues that speech can harm directly or indirectly, or both. It may
directly offend, denigrate, humiliate or frighten the people it purports to
describe. Speech can also bring about harm indirectly and with equal or even
greater brutality by motivating others to think and act against members of the
group in question like was the case in Kenya in 2007/ 2008. When an act of
speech has a reasonable chance of catalyzing or amplifying violence by one
group against another, given the circumstances in which it was made or disse-
minated, it is dangerous speech (Benesch, 2011). 
Although stereotyping across tribes in Kenya is usually largely perceived
as harmless, when compounded with derogatory remarks and use of animal
names such as cockroaches, madoadoa (spots), weed, vultures, hyenas, dog it
is likely to cause ethnic tension. Although extremely inflammatory speech may
not by itself cause physical violence, like was the case in March 2013 elec-
tions, it has the capacity to promote or inflame violence when people are
heavily influenced by such speech.
5. Results
5. 1. Analysis of extremely inciting messages
Extremely inciting speech is speech that may catalyze mass violence by influen-
cing and inciting the audience to rise against the other community in a violent
way. Inflammatory/Inciting speech focuses on the effect on the audience and
not the state of mind of the speaker (Umati Report, 2013) and it has the highest
potential to catalyse violence. For analysis, the verbatim hate messages are in
bold letter and our explanations are in brackets. 
1.– “Jaluo zote ziko bonde la ufa. Zitoke polepole. Coz lazima mtahiri
na mabati ata mkose kuanza fujo. Iyo ni kitu imepangwa vizuri. All Luos in
the rift valley you better start moving out of there because you will be force-
fully circumcised using iron sheets even if you don’t cause chaos. This is
something that has been well planned.”
(The above message which was originally send in a mix of Kiswahili and
English calls for the circumcising of Luo men who live in the Rift valley, which
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is a cosmopolitan region with members from different ethnic communities.
Traditionally the Luo community does not circumcise their males. It is impor-
tant to note that the Rift Valley part of Kenya, which is also the most productive
(the country’s bread basket) has been the worst hit in previous post election clas-
hes and therefore such a message was likely to spark grave memories of past
victims some of whom are still living in Camps as Internally Displaced Persons).
2.–“Bcoz Kikuyus are thieves the response of a thief is fire...bcoz u always
like to live on hard way this opinion poll=violence..... NO RAILA NO RAIS.” 
(Send by a CORD supporter. Kikuyus and Luos have been the worst poli-
tical enemies since Independence. Luos have always accused the Kikuyus of
‘cheating and stealing their Presidency. The author of the message threatens that
if Raila does not become president then there will be chaos- there will be no
president- ‘NO RAILA NO RAIS’. ‘RAIS’ is a Swahili word for president). 
3.–“I urge all my tribesmen to figt, anihilate, assasinate and execute,
when the opportunity will present itself, all those who benefied in this squa-
bles. REVENGE!!REVENGE!!REVENGE!!” 
(This message explicitly calls for physical violence. In 2007, when such
messages were circulated through SMS, members of one community would go
out in the streets and actually kill members of the other community).
4.–Wakatwe vichwa hawa wabara chinja hao washenzi kabisa (“Behead
all of them,non coastal residents,butcher them they are all fools).
(This was circulated by members in the Coast Region which was largely
Pro- CORD and prior to the elections they had called for cession from the
Kenya because of historical land injustices meted on them since independen-
ce. One of the main contentious issues in the 2013 elections as in any other
election in Kenya was land and Uhuru Kenyatta was on the spotlight for his
family owning large tracts of land in the Coastal region). 
5.–“Wakikuyu wahame nyanza and their businesses should be groun-
ded to ashes.”(Kikuyus should start moving from Nyanza and their busines-
ses should be grounded to ashes)
Wajaluo tukishidwa i know we must ngoa reli, rusha mawe, choma
maduka ya kununua maziwa, kuchoma tyre bararabara” Turushe mawe kabi-
saa hadi mungu wetu Raila, Angwambo aje atwambie tuache. Sisi ni Sirkal!”
“kwani twangojani?si tuanze fujo?Mimi ni mwanamke bt kazi ntakayoifan-
ya mtapenda;;;i hate Kenyanz;;;i hate …(land grabbers)”.
(This was an explicit call to loot, engage in unlawful behaviour by
members of the Luo community against Kikuyus. Generally Luos are stereotyped
to be unruly and violent especially during elections and that is what the writer
is implying in Kiswahili).
index.comunicación | nº 3(2) | New African Communication
46
THE ETHNIC HATE SPEECH WAS NETWORKED: WHAT POLITICAL... | JACINTA MWENDE MAWEU
47
6.–“We,the Free Kenya Army ve declared war. We’ll kill all kikuyus. Lets
C hw u can rule us dead.Uhuru brought this to his pple.”.
(This is a explicit call for violence to members of the Kikuyu ethnic
community).
7.– Kikuyus preparing to slaughter Kalenjins in ELDORET despite
them being in the same coalition. This is happening in Eldoret now.”
(In 2007/2008, the worst hit town by the post election violence was Eldoret.
Kalenjins, who claim to be the indigenous inhabitants of the Rift Valley, where
Eldoret is located accuse the Kkiuyus of invading their land. And therefore this
was a highly inciting message that was likely flare tempers). 
8.– “I smell some KIKUYU’S stinking up the media waves. Those
FUCKING KIKUYU sons of bitches. I wish I could find & KILL ONE!” 
9.– I do support Maina Kamanda who says CORD leader better be
hanged for Kenya to hav peace”.
(An explicit call for the execution of Raila Odinga, the CORD leader. The
author says he/she supports the call by a prominent politician from the Kikuyu
ethnic community: Maina Kamanda).
From the analysis it was evident that immediately after the elections on
March 4th, there was an increase in extremely inciting messages targeted at
three main tribes (Kikuyus, from which the current president, Uhuru Kenyatta
hails; Kalenjin, from which the Deputy President William Ruto hails; and Luo
from which Raila Odinga, the main loser comes from) as well as supporters of
the two main political parties (Jubilee supporters and CORD supporters). It was
also evident that most of the inciting speech online was as a response to events
happening on the ground as reported by the mainstream media. The highly inci-
ting speech ranged from extremely vulgar language directed to members of a
particular tribe, to calling members of one tribe to kill the other to advocating
for eviction of a particular tribe from their land. The pattern of hate speech
circulated in 2013 was very similar in tone to that circulated in 2007/2008
though this didn’t culminate to physical violence, but very fierce soft ethnic war
online. There were several Social Media pages such as ‘Not another Kikuyu
President’ and ‘STOP Raila NOW’ where supporters of either presidential
candidate traded insults and offensive remarks.
5. 2. Analysis of ethnic comments meant to insult a particular group
Comments in this category are mostly intended to insult a particular group
through stereotypes or sheer abuses. The speaker does not generally call upon
the audience to do anything harmful against the targeted group and hence state-
ments in this category have very little potential to cause physical violence. The
following comments fall under this category:
1.–Wajaluo(Luos) na nyef nyef zao....waanze kuhama... Jaluos wil neva
rule kenya! smely fish”
(Targeted at members of the Luo Ethnic community, who are known to be
fish lovers).
2.–“This Kikuyu men who are always getting kichapo (beating) from
women wanatuambia nini (what can they tell us?). Thank God am able to
befriend Wajaluo and we are in agreement tht Kikuyus a common enemy”
“The biggest insecurity in kenya is caused by the kikuyus forget the alsha-
baab.”
(This message send by one who belongs to neither the Kikuyu nor the Luo
community ridicules the men from the Kikuyu community for being battered
by their wives. The author also comments that Kikuyus, whose stereotype is ‘thie-
ves and conmen’ are a worse threat to security in Kenya than the Alshabab. The
author who seems to be a ‘Luo sympathizer’ portrays the Kikuyus as a nuisance).
3.–Havent you realized thiz guyz (Luos) spend more than they can
make and they keep borrowing ndo maana wanataka kutupeleka (that is why
they want to take us) on the west.uko tulitoka,bye rao (We moved from there
Bye Raila).
(The author insinuates that Luos are responsible for the tribulations of the
president Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto for the charges they are
facing against Humanity at the Hague. That was one of the allegations being
peddled around during the election campaigns).
4.–Hamjambo wazalendo, huu ni wakati mwafaka wa kuajisha mwenye
kuelekea jikoni ya kupiga samaki na mandazi kazi. Aliomba kazi na si tumpa-
tie? UHURUTOSHA!( How are you Patriots, this is the perfect tim to prepa-
re the one whoi is going to be cooking fish and Mandazi job. He asked for
that job we should give him, Uhuru for President). 
(This is a ridicule directed to Raila Odinga; that he should prepare to go
home to ‘cook fish’. Luos are known to love eating fish and their main econo-
mic activity is fishing).
5.–kikuyus why is it that ur minds revolves around luo's uncircum's
dicks, yet ur cicum's dicks r so weak that u let dogs to fuck ur women 4r u.
Shame on u wth ur small dicks kama peremende!. 
(This is derogatory comment that has sexual innuendo. Luo community
does not circumcise their males and the kikuyus always ridicule them for being
still ‘boys’. So the author here is insulting the Kikuyus by questioning the sexual
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prowess of their circumcised genitals which do not seem to sexually satisfy the
Kikuyu women). 
6.–Kumbe wameru wako na akili ndogo ivi. Funda kabisa. Hasira mingi
na kukula miraa kama mambuzi ndio kazi.Meru’s u r idiots. Kufienimbali
na izo kura zenu za Tharaka Nithi. Kubaff! (“So meru’s have small brains like
that,donkeys!They are quick to get mad and all they know is chewing khat
like goats.Meru’s are idiots.you people should just die!”).
(The members of the Meru Ethnic community were supporting Kikuyus
and therefore the author insults them for that insinuating that they are only good
at chewing Miraa. The Miraa (Khat) plant is the main source of income for
meru residents).
7.–"While we believe in democracy and freedom of choice for Kenyans,
may I take this opportunity to WARN Kenyans that BADCHOICES like
Raila may LEAD to serious and IRREVERSIBLE consequences".
(This was an explicit ‘warning’ by a non-Raila supporter that electing Raila
would be disastrous to Kenya. Such a message has the potential of igniting a
bitter exchange between the Pro-Raila supporters and their opponents. The
message can also be said to be meant to paint Raila, the politician in a negative
light in an attempt to minimize his chances of winning the elections).
6. Conclusions 
From the analysis, it appears that online hate speech could be a reflection of
the conversations Kenyans engage in offline, and thus offer a way to unders-
tand recurring issues that need to be taken into account if hate speech and
ethnicised politics is to be addressed in Kenya in future elections. The alter-
native spaces provided by social media offered opportunities for the free
exchange of opinions among citizens, and thus played a role in demolishing
the existing closed structure of discussion and expanding the now open system
of discourse. But as is evident from the above analysis, the same spaces can be
effectively used to undermine constructive dialogue and to undermine peace
through spreading hate speech. As observed earlier, the main stream media
were highly cautious in what they reported to avoid a repeat of 2007/2008 post
election violence and therefore the social media forums provided spaces for
citizens to vent out their bottled emotions. The alternative public spaces can
therefore be said to have facilitated counter-discourse that was produced and
consumed by counter-publics, who had their expression or voices suppressed
by the existing social order, as they interacted among themselves (Woo-Young,
2005). But this did not necessarily translate to constructive dialogue as is
evident from the messages above.
It can also be observed that the main purpose of online political forums in
the March 2013 general elections was to offer a platform to showcase personal
expression. The online communication seems to have been primarily one way,
and participants perused the views of others primarily to learn where they stand
on the issues and, if necessary, rebut them. And in the process, the participants
engaged in what Alonzo and Aiken (2004: 205) define as Flaming: “hostile
intentions characterized by words of profanity, obscenity, and insults that inflict
harm to a person or an organization resulting from uninhibited behavior”. As is
evident from the messages above, there was rampant flaming among social
media users after and before the March elections. It can therefore be observed
that social media networks in the 2013 general elections in Kenya acted as
“opium of the masses” only serving the function of keeping Kenya “quiet and
peaceful” to prevent a repeat of the 2008 post election violence, but not alter-
native public spheres to facilitate constructive political deliberation. It is evident
that the soft ethnic war online in 2013 was just as vile as the physical ethnic war
witnessed in the 2007/2008 post election violence. 
Therefore in as much as we cannot overlook the positive democratic gains
that both the old and new media has brought especially in emerging democra-
cies in Africa like Kenya by minimizing chances of election rigging, opening
up democratic space, and providing a new form of public sphere, we cannot,
on the same note, ignore the glaring fact that new media, especially social
media (Twitter and Facebook) is being used to amplify political “ghosts”, in the
form of ethnic hate speech. As is evident from the analysis of the Twitter and
Facebook messages above, most of the political discussions on social media plat-
forms were largely centered on the tribal political chiefs and the political
content in the “old” media. This therefore resulted to “new public spaces”, “old
ethnic politics” shaped by the minority political class. We therefore argue that
while social networks maybe effective at increasing political participation, such
participation may not necessarily translate into political empowerment that is
key to the success of any democracy. 
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